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Robust Design in Game Theory: Bayesian Optimization Approach to Minimax
Problems with Equilibrium Constraints
Jianan Jian, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2021
Modern engineering systems have become increasingly complex due to the integration
of human actors and advanced artificial intelligence, both of which can be interpreted as
intelligent agents. Game theory is a mathematical framework that provides an explanatory
model for systems constituted of those intelligent agents. It postulates that the apparent
behavior of a system is an equilibrium resulting from each agent within the system individ-
ually optimizing their own objectives. Thus, designing an intelligent system is to identify
a configuration such that its equilibrium is desirable with respect to some external criteria.
However, equilibria are often not unique and form sets that lack topological properties on
which optimization heavily relies on, e.g., convexity, connectedness, or even compactness in
some cases. The unsureness nature, i.e., uncertainty, of equilibria also appeals for another
common design criterion: robustness. In this context, a robust design should reach worst-
case optimality to avoid sensitivity to the eventual outcome among all possible equilibria.
In this dissertation, I incorporate both the game theoretical aspect and the robustness
requirement of system design using the formulation of minimax problems with equilibrium
constraints. The complexity of the problem structure and the non-uniqueness of potential
equilibria require a new solution strategy different from traditional gradient based methods.
I propose a Bayesian approach which infers the probabilistic belief of the optimality of a
design given sampled objective function values. Due to the anisotropic natural of systems
of independent agents, I then revisit the original Kushner’s Wiener process prior instead of
radial basis kernel prior despite their popularity for other global optimization applications.
I also derive theoretical results on sample maxima and their locations, develop an effective
method to decompose the search space into independent regions, and design necessary adap-
tations to take into account the equilibrium constraints and minimax objective. Finally, I
discuss a few applications of the proposed design framework.
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1.0 Introduction
Human-in-the-loop systems and artificial intelligent systems have increasing applications
in engineering. The dynamics of individual components in these systems may not be directly
understood or engineered, but their interactions often follow basic principles put forward by
the game theory. Game theory is a mathematical framework which provides an explana-
tory model for systems constituted of multiple intelligent agents. It postulates that the
apparent behavior of a system is an equilibrium resulting from each agent within the system
individually optimizing their own objectives. In this dissertation, I investigate optimal de-
sign problems in this game theoretical framework, which aims at finding the values of game
parameters which fulfill desired criteria.
In the rest of the first chapter, I give a brief history regarding the subjects of interest.
A motivating example is then given to illustrate the problems this dissertation attempts to
solve. The contributions of this dissertation is summarized. In the second chapter, I discuss
some theoretical aspects in optimization, especially the topological properties. The mathe-
matical formulation of the main focus of this dissertation is given and the basic properties
are discussed. In the third chapter, mathematical programming methods based on Bayesian
optimization are developed to effectively solve the design problems. In the fourth chapter, I
show more concrete applications related to the proposed framework of game design.
1.1 Background
Modern game theory was established by John von Neumann with his 1928 paper [34],
in which he proved the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person zero-sum finite
games using Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. John Nash [23] proposed a solution concept
to games with multiple players, generalizing the work of von Neumann. Game theory at-
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tracted considerable development since 1950s and found phenomenal achievements especially
in mathematical economics. Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was rewarded to
game theorists in numerous years.
Way before the modern game theory was conceived, in the 17th century mathematicians
started to study a different aspect of games. In the letter exchange between Blaise Pascal and
Pierre Fermat, they discussed the problem of division of the stakes, consisting in designing
a game of chance which is fair to the players. To define fairness, they established the
concept of expected values. Their foundational discussion is now considered as the birth of
the probability theory [30]. In the 18th century, Thomas Bayes and Pierre-Simon Laplace
proved a powerful theorem for data analysis, known as Bayes’ theorem today. This theorem
was developed into Bayesian inference, which revolutionized the study of probability and
statistics. Today, Bayesian methods empowers numerous algorithms in machine learning for
classification and regression.
Game theory has benefit from recent rapid development of machine learning. Reinforce-
ment learning is a branch of machine learning inspired by the mathematical theory of optimal
control and the biological function of dopamine in nervous system. Using the concept of re-
ward, reinforcement learning can solve complex problems in game theory [26]. On the other
hand, game theoretical framework also inspired powerful machine learning algorithm such
as generative adversarial networks [13]. Inverse reinforcement learning consists in recovering
the unknown reward structure guiding the behavior of an agent from the external observa-
tion of the agent’s behavior. It is an active and fruitful field of research [1, 25] and gave rise
to generalizations to multi-agent system [14, 24].
The existing literature on the design problems in game theory [5, 2, 36] almost exclusively
focuses on local solutions using gradient-based methods. The existence of multiple equilibria,
a significant feature of games, is often overlooked. This dissertation tries to fill up this gap
by providing a global point of view with the introduction of the concept of robustness and
a Bayesian solution approach.
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1.2 Example
To illustrate the type of engineering problems interested in this dissertation, I propose
the following example.
Example 1. In a country with the geography X = [0, 1]2, let there be N cities located
respectively at (xi, yi) ∈ X , each having a potential air traffic market of size zi, and M
airline hubs located respectively at (uj, vj) ∈ X , each having the control over their service
radius rj for a cost g(r
2
j ) = g0 exp(αr
2
j ) where α ≥ 0. If a city falls in the service area of
multiple hubs, then the air traffic market of that city is equally shared among those hubs.
Suppose all the hubs aim at maximizing their profits and their service radii reach a Nash
equilibrium, which solves the following optimization problems.
(r∗j , s
∗












j − d2ij) ≥ 0 ∀i, j
0 ≤ sij ≤ 1 ∀i, j
0 ≤ rj ≤ 1 ∀j
The constant d2ij = (xi − uj)2 + (yi − vj)2 is the squared distance between city i and airport





airport j always satisfies r∗j ∈ {dij}, s∗ij ∈ {0, 1}. As a result, the action space of each player
is effectively finite with cardinality N , the equilibria of the game can be obtained through
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. As we will be interested in the variables
M and α, denote the set of equilibria by Φ(M,α).
Now the government is planning an infrastructure project that will entirely determine
the cost parameter α. Suppose the government wants to avoid a game of multiple equilibria,








s.t. (r, s) ∈ Φ(M,α)
(r′, s′) ∈ Φ(M,α)
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Suppose, in a different scenario, the government wants to maximize the total air traffic
coverage and at the same time to hedge against a potential recession that only M ′ hubs
will survive. The hedging objective is to reduce the worst-case loss of previously established
















s.t. (r, s) ∈ Φ(M,α)
(r′, s′) ∈ Φ(M ′, α)
Figure 1: Performance (1.1) of the equilibria given the parameter α. Multiple points with the
same abscissa result from different Nash equilibria attained at that value of α. The optimal
worst-case performance is reached at any value of α in [0.300, 0.303] or in [0.325, 0.356].
(N = 20,M = 5,M ′ = 3, g0 = 2, µ = 0.4)
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The design problems I illustrate here are examples of MPEC (mathematical programming
with equilibrium constraints). Specifically, they look for optimal designs which relate two
or more versions of a game by posing optimization problems with their Nash equilibria as
the constraints. At the same time, the upper level of these problems are minimax problems.
Due to the possibility of multiple equilibria in a game, a robust design should take into
consideration the worst-case scenario and aims at achieving optimality in this case.
1.3 Contributions
This dissertation examines minimax problems with equilibrium constraints and proposes
a solution based on Bayesian optimization. Although minimax problems and equilibrium
constraints have been long studied as separate subjects, they have received little attention
as a combined problem due to the complexity. In this dissertation, I highlight with ex-
amples the importance of this formulation in designing multi-agent systems. Instead of
the traditional optimization techniques focused on gradient-based methods, a novel solution
methodology is proposed to treat this type of problems. I make a few adaptations of the
existing Bayesian optimization specifically to incorporate equilibrium constraints and mini-
max objective. Among others, I show the Wiener process prior proposed by Kushner does
not provide a uniform prior on the maximizers and I propose a simple method to obtain
a uniform prior. I propose a generalization of the Wiener process to higher dimensions for
the purpose of finding game equilibria. This generalization is different from traditional high
dimensional Bayesian optimization which prefers the isotropy of search space. The lack of
isotropy in my generalization is justified by the anisotropic nature of systems of indepen-
dent agents. I show how this generalization decomposes the search space into independent
regions given sampled objective function values. Theoretical results on sample maxima can
be applied on each of the regions, and be combined to obtain the probabilistic belief of the
optimality of a design. This novel solution approach can also be generalized and applied to
related problems such as other multilevel optimization problems.
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2.0 Theoretical Models of Optimization and Games
In this section, I first review some standard optimization problems and state compactness
results of their solutions. Then I continue the same discussion for games. These are the
theoretical basis upon which we can further build design problems.
Optimization theory makes use heavily of the theory of correspondences. A correspon-
dence from the set X to the set Y is a function from the set X to the power set 2Y . It
can also be characterized by a binary relation between X and Y , or equivalently the graph
of the relation. The use of correspondences instead of functions reflect the key property of
optimization that a problem can have zero, one, or multiple optimizers.
Optimization problems are characterized by the mathematical structures they are en-
dowed with, notably their topological property. In consequence, different notions of con-
tinuity of correspondences [6] play a major role in providing topological properties to the
optimizers of a problem.
2.1 Single-Agent Optimization
The input-output relation of complex systems demonstrates the property of agency. Such
systems are called agents. Optimization problems are a mathematical model of agents.
Definition 1 (Optimization problem). An optimization problem P constitutes of a set X
called the state space, a set Y called the action space, a function f : X × Y → R called the
payoff function, and a correspondence C : X ⇒ Y called the constraint. The correspondence
F : X ⇒ Y given by F (x) = arg max{f(x, y) | y ∈ C(x)} is called the solution. A selector
of F is called a strategy.
The following proposition gives conditions which guarantee the existence of a strategy
to P .
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Proposition 1. If Y is a topological space, f is upper semicontinuous in y, and C has
nonempty and compact values, then P admits a nonempty and compact set of strategies.
Proof. By [6, Theorem 2.43], F (x) are nonempty and compact. Hence, the set of strategies
is nonempty by the axiom of choice and compact by Tychonoff’s theorem.
An additional property of agents, which may affect their outputs, is the information
available to them. The information structure of an agent is modeled by a σ-algebra on X so
that a strategy is compatible with the information structure if and only if it is measurable.
The following proposition gives additional conditions which guarantee the existence of a
measurable strategy.
Proposition 2. If X is a measurable space, Y is a separable metrizable space, f is measur-
able in x and continuous in y, and C is measurable and has nonempty and compact values,
then P admits a nonempty and compact set of measurable strategies.
Proof. By [6, Theorem 18.19], F admits a measurable selector. As Y is metrizable, the
space of measurable functions from X to Y is closed. By Proposition 1, the set of selectors
is compact. The set of measurable selectors, being the intersection of a closed subset and
a compact subset within the Hausdorff space Y X equipped with the product topology, is
compact.
When X is a measure space and Y is a Banach space, we can discuss the compactness
of the set of strategies in Lp(X, Y ).
Proposition 3. Suppose X is a perfect probability space and Y is a bounded subset of a
Banach space. The set of measurable strategies is nonempty and compact in Lp(X, Y ).
Proof. Let N : Y → R be the norm on Y . Consider the map ϕ1 : Y X → RX given
by f 7→ N ◦ f . First prove that ϕ1 is continuous with respect to the product topologies.
The set of all subsets V := {g : X → R | g(x0) ∈ U}, where x0 ∈ X and U ⊆ R is
an open set, is a subbase of the product topology on RX . The preimage of V by ϕ1 is
{f : X → Y | N(f(x0)) ∈ U} = {f : X → Y | f(x0) ∈ N−1(U)}. As the norm N is
continuous, N−1(U) is open in Y and ϕ−11 (V ) is open in the product topology of Y
X .
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Let K be the compact set of measurable strategies X → Y . As ϕ1 is continuous, the
image ϕ1(K) is compact in RX . By [12], pointwise compactness implies L0-compactness.
By the Vitali convergence theorem, L0-compactness implies Lp-compactness given uniformly
integrability. Therefore, ϕ1(K) is nonempty and compact in L
p(X,R).
The boundedness of Y ensures K ⊆ Lp(X, Y ). Consider the map ϕ2 : K → Lp(X,R)
given by f 7→ N ◦ f . Prove that ϕ2 is continuous with respect to the Lp-norms. Let ε > 0
and δ = ε > 0, then whenever ‖fn−f‖ =
∫
X
(N ◦(fn−f))pdµ < δ, by the triangle inequality,
‖N ◦ fn−N ◦ f‖ =
∫
X
|N ◦ fn−N ◦ f |pdµ ≤
∫
X
(N ◦ (fn− f))pdµ < δ = ε. As a continuous
map from a compact space to a Hausdorff space, ϕ2 is proper. Therefore K is compact in
Lp(X, Y ).
An agent has partial information when the state space is (X,Σ) but f is not Σ-measurable
in x. Expected utility theory postulates that, provided with a belief structure modeled by
a probability space (X,F , µ) on X such that σ(f) ⊆ F and Σ ⊆ F , the agent follows a
strategy given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let Y ⊆ Rd be a Euclidean domain. Suppose C is Σ-measurable and has
nonempty and compact values. Let fy : X → R be the F-measurable function x 7→ f(x, y).
If y 7→ fy is an α-Hölder continuous function Y → Lp(X,F , µ) where p ≥ 1 and αp > d,
then there is a conditional expectation of fy with respect to Σ, denoted by gy, such that
the correspondence G : X ⇒ Y given by G(x) = arg max{gy(x) | y ∈ C(x)} admits a Σ-
measurable selector. The set of all such Σ-measurable selectors is compact in the quotient
topology under almost-sureness.
Proof. Let hy be a conditional expectation of fy with respect to Σ. By the conditional
Jensen’s inequality [37], y 7→ hy is an α-Hölder continuous function Y → Lp(X,Σ, µ|Σ).
By the Kolmogorov continuity theorem [22, Theorem 2.1], y 7→ hy admits a Σ-measurable
continuous modification y 7→ gy. By Proposition 2, G admits a nonempty and compact set
of Σ-measurable selectors.
Two conditional expectations only differ on a null set, so any strategies associated to
them only differ on a null set. On the other hand, if a Σ-measurable function ψ : X → Y
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differs from a strategy associated to gy on a null set N , then let hy(x) = gy(x) for all x 6∈ N ,
let hy(x) = 0 for all x ∈ N and y 6= ψ(x), and let hy(x) = 1 for all x ∈ N and y = ψ(x), so
that hy is a conditional expectation of fy and ψ(x) ∈ arg max{hx(x) | y ∈ C(x)}, i.e. ψ is
also a strategy given by a conditional expectation. Therefore, in the quotient space, the set
of all Σ-measurable strategies associated to any conditional expectations is identified with
the compact set of Σ-measurable strategies associated to a single conditional expectations
gy.
Remark 1. A generalization of the Kolomogorov continuity theorem to dyadically separable
metric spaces is given by [27].
2.2 Multi-Agent Games
Non-cooperative games are a mathematical model of systems constituted of multiple
agents, in which the behavior of the agents are commonly modeled with Nash equilibria.
Definition 2 (Normal-form game). A normal-form game G constitutes of a set A whose
elements are called agents, a set X called the state space, and, for each agent a ∈ A, a set
Ya called the action space, a correspondence Ca : X × Y ⇒ Ya called the constraint, and a
function fa : X × Y → R called the payoff function, where Y :=
∏
a∈A Ya.
For each agent a ∈ A, an optimization problem Pa is associated to G, of which the
state space is X × Y , the action space is Ya, the constraint is Ca, and the payoff function
is ψa := fa ◦ (idX ×ra), where the substitution function ra : Y × Ya → Y is given by
proja(ra(y, ŷa)) = ŷa and projb(ra(y, ŷa)) = projb(y) for all b ∈ A\{a}. Let Fa : X×Y ⇒ Ya
be the solution to Pa.
Let Ψx : Y ⇒ Y be the correspondence given by Ψx(y) =
∏
a∈A Fa(x, y). Denote the set
of fixed point of Ψx by Φx. The correspondence Φ : X ⇒ Y given by Φ(x) = Φx is called
the solution to G. A selector of Φ is called a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proposition 5. Let Ya be nonempty compact convex subsets of locally convex Hausdorff
spaces. Suppose Ca are continuous and have nonempty, compact, and convex values. Suppose
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fa is continuous in y and quasiconcave in ya. Then G has a nonempty and compact set of
Nash equilibria. In addition, Φ is upper hemicontinuous if X is Hausdorff.
Proof. By the maximum theorem [33, Theorem 9.17], Fa is upper hemicontinuous with
nonempty, compact, and convex values. By Kakutani fixed point theorem, Φx is nonempty
and compact. The upper hemicontinuity of Φ is given in [11, Proposition 3.5].
Games with non-trivial information structure are defined in [35] and [9].
Definition 3 (Extensive-form game). The state space (X,X ) is a measurable space. The
action space (Ya,Ya) of each agent a ∈ A is a measurable space. The information structure




. The strategy of each agent
is a (Σa,Ya)-measurable function. A player is a subset of agents p ⊆ A such that the set
of players is a partition of the set of agents. Each player has a (Σ,BR)-measurable payoff
function fp and a belief µp on (X,X ). The best response of player p is the correspondence










(fp ◦ η)dµp (2.1)
s.t. λa ◦ η = proja ◦η ∀a 6∈ p (2.2)
λ∗a ◦ η = proja ◦η ∀a ∈ p (2.3)
λ∗a : X × Y → Ya is Σa-measurable ∀a ∈ p (2.4)
η : X → X × Y is Σ-measurable. (2.5)
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game is a fixed point of the correspondence λ 7→∏p Fp(λ)
together with the function η : X → X × Y it uniquely determines.
Proposition 5 is a special case where all the players have no information exchange with
any other players. But in general, the Kakutani fixed point theorem can be inapplicable due
to the lack of convexity in the constraints (2.2) and (2.3). Thus it is necessary to acknowledge
that the set of equilibria of an extensive-form game may be empty or non-compact in further
discussions.
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2.3 Parametrized Game Optimization
Let G be a game defined in Definition 2 where X and Y are compact Hausdorff spaces
and Φ : X ⇒ Y be its solution. Consider X as the action space of an additional agent
whose payoff function is denoted by ϕ : X × Y → R. Define the worst-case value function






Assume Φ has nonempty and compact values. Some sufficient conditions regarding
whether the infimum or the supremum is attainable are stated as follows.
• If X is a finite set, then the supremum is attainable. If Y is a finite set, then the infimum
is attainable. If ϕ takes discrete values, then both the infimum and the supremum are
attainable.
• If Φ is upper hemicontinuous and ϕ is lower semicontinuous, then the infimum is attain-
able [6, Lemma 17.30].
• If Φ is lower hemicontinuous and ϕ is upper semicontinuous, then the supremum is
attainable [19, Theorem 9.2.1].
However, the solution to a game is not lower hemicontinuous in general. If the supremum
is not attainable, the agent has to select a suboptimal solution in the nonempty set Vε :=
{x ∈ X | v(x) ≥ sup v − ε} for a small threshold ε.
Similarly for games with non-trivial information structures, let Φ′ be the set of η that






This formulation transforms the coupled constraint (x, y) ∈ Gr Φ into separate constraints
x ∈ X, η ∈ Φ′ at the price of considering functions η : X → Y instead of points y ∈ Y .
From the game theoretical point of view, the minimax problem (2.7) is a two-player zero-sum
Stackelberg game. However, the minimax theorem cannot be applied here without Φ′ being
nonempty, compact, and convex.
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2.4 Gradient-Based Methods
Problem (2.6) is a special minimax problem with an equilibrium constraint y ∈ Φ(x). The
lower level MPEC problem can be solved by replacing the equilibrium constraints with the
KKT (Karush–Kuhn–Tucker) conditions. Suppose there are finite number of agents and each
agent’s action space is a sublevel set of a convex function within an affine Euclidean subspace,




− ) ∩ h−1a ({0}qa) where ga : Rna → Rpa is convex and ha : ya 7→ Aaya + ba
is affine. For all j = 1, · · · , pa, assume gaj(y∗a) < 0 for some y∗a ∈ h−1a ({0}qa) in the affine
subspace and limt→∞ gaj(tya) = +∞ for all ya 6= 0, so that ga satisfy Slater’s condition and
Ya are nonempty and bounded. Let fx,a(y, ya) := fa(x, ra(y, ya)). The constraint y ∈ Φ(x)
can be written as
∀a :












Assume the smoothness of fa and ga, then a relaxation to the above constraint is stated by
the KKT conditions
Lal(x, y, µ, λ) = 0 ∀l = 1 · · · , na
Gak(y, µ) = 0 ∀k = 1, · · · , pa
haj(ya) = 0 ∀j = 1 · · · , qa
∀a = 1, · · · , |A|
where







Lal(x, y, µ, λ) =
∂La
∂yal




2 − µak − gak(ya).
The complementarity condition is formulated with the Fischer-Burmeister merit function
[21], to translate the disjunction gak(ya) ≥ µak = 0 or µak ≥ gak(ya) = 0. It has numerical
advantages over the inner product formulation µTa ga(ya) = 0 [16, 17].
12







{ϕ(x, y) | ∀l, k, j, a : Lal(x, y, µ, λ) = Gak(y, µ) = haj(y) = 0}
can be solved with further KKT conditions or with appropriate relaxations [31].
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3.0 Bayesian Approach to Parametrized Games
Gradient-based methods suffer from a few limitations in our application. First, the func-
tions involved need to have (sub-)gradients. Second, two levels of optimization together with
an equilibrium constraint results in a large set of KKT equations, high order of derivatives,
and accumulated relaxations or approximations. Third and most importantly, the equilibria
of a game can have non-connected components, all of which need to be considered in a de-
sign process. This cannot be achieved effectively through a local method. In this chapter,
I propose the application of the Bayesian optimization method to solve parametrized game
problems.
The Bayesian optimization method was first proposed by Kushner [20], and has found
many applications in machine learning [32]. Two main ingredients of a typical Bayesian
optimization method are a Gaussian process prior and an acquisition function. The Gaus-
sian process prior models how samples inform the belief and the acquisition function models
how the belief guides sampling in return. In recent literature, the most popular prior is the
squared exponential kernel, the most popular acquisition function is the expected improve-
ment. In this dissertation, I use the Wiener process prior originally proposed by Kushner.
It has the advantage of having an analytical expression of the probability of reaching maxi-
mum. So the acquisition function used in this dissertation is based on optimality instead of
improvement.
3.1 Single-Variable Bayesian Optimization
A fundamental assumption of games with perfect information is that the payoff functions
are common knowledge. From the theoretical point of view, knowing the function and
knowing all the values of the function are equivalent. But from the computational point of
view, they are distinct. A function f is known in the sense that there is a known algorithm
which outputs the function value f(t) when a variable t is provided as input. In other words,
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before the input is provided and the output is probed, the value of the function is a priori
unknown, although the function is assumed known. This uncertainty justifies a Bayesian
approach to optimization, as first proposed in [20].
For simplicity, suppose f is a real-valued continuous function defined on the unit interval
[0, 1]. Let (ti)1≤i≤n be a strictly monotonically increasing sequence
1 on [0, 1] and Fn a
random process on [0, 1] such that the distribution of Fn(t) describes the Bayesian belief of
f(t) after all the function values (f(ti))1≤i≤n are obtained.
A simple way to construct Fn is to use Wiener processes. The standard Wiener process
(W (t))t≥0 can be defined as the zero-mean Gaussian process on R+ characterized by the
covariance function E[W (t)W (s)] = min{t, s}. It can also be characterised by its properties.
P1: Starting at the origin: W (0) = 0,
P2: Continuous path: W (t) is continuous in t,
P3: Markovian increments: W (s)−W (t) is independent of (W (τ))τ≤min{t,s}.
P4: Stationary Gaussian increments: W (s)−W (t) is Gaussian N (0, |s− t|).
Stationarity in P4 reflects a homogeneous uncertainty of the function values at all points.
The Markov property in P3 requires the uncertainty of the function to propagate without
memory. The distribution of increments is assumed Gaussian, but we will discuss later
whether any modification may be needed. P2 reflects the continuity of f as desired. In fact,
the support of the Wiener measure is the set of all continuous functions starting from the
origin [28, Corollary 3.31]. P1 provides the Wiener process a deterministic endpoint. This
is somehow undesired in our application because the function values at the endpoints are
also a priori unknown. To obtain a deterministic value of the function, we must sample it.
So instead of postulating a prior belief F0, we begin by establishing F1 as
F1(t) = f(t1) +W
1(t)−W 1(t1) =
f(t1) +W
2(t1 − t), t ∈ [0, t1]
f(t1) +W
1(t− t1), t ∈ [t1, 1].
where W 1 and W 2 are two independent Wiener processes. More generally, the process of
sampling simply breaks down the process Fi into one forward Wiener process, one backward
1Sampling needs not to be performed in increasing order. The monotonocity is assumed only to simplify
notation. Sampling at repeating locations are simply redundant, as we assume the observation is noiseless.
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Wiener process, and (n − 1) Brownian bridges in-between. In particular, the marginal
distribution of Fn(t) is a Gaussian with the mean and the variance
t ∈ [0, t1] :
µ(t) = f(t1)σ2(t) = t1 − t (3.1)
t ∈ [ti, ti+1] :
µ(t) = (f(ti+1)(t− ti) + f(ti)(ti+1 − t))/(ti+1 − ti)σ2(t) = (ti+1 − t)(t− ti)/(ti+1 − ti) (3.2)
t ∈ [tn, 1] :
µ(t) = f(tn)σ2(t) = t− tn. (3.3)
Now consider the maximum of Fn and where it is reached. Let W (t) := maxs∈[0,t] W (s)
and Fn := maxs∈[0,1] Fn(s). For n = 1, the cumulative distribution function of the maximum
F1 is given by

















Figure 2 plots this probability as a function of t1 for small ε and shows that a function
value sampled close to the boundary has a higher chance to be close to the function max-
imum. This imbalance is a direct result of the property of Gaussian increments in P4. If




1(φ(t1 − t))−W 1(φ(0)), t ∈ [0, t1]
f(t1) +W
2(φ(t− t1))−W 2(φ(0)), t ∈ [t1, 1].
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Figure 2: Probability of the first sampled function value being close to the function maximum
as a function of the sample location.
17
then the probability is given by















(φ(t)− φ(0)))(φ(1− t)− φ(0)))
ε2 + o(ε2).
When φ(t) = t/(1 − t), this probability is independent of t for small ε. This time change
balances out the effect in Figure 2 by hyperbolically stretching out the uncertainty of the
function values when t gets away from t1.
Our objective is to locate the function maximum given Fn, so we want to calculate
the distribution of Fn+1 as a function of tn+1 ∈ [0, 1] for the next sample. Let (xi)0≤i≤n+2
be the monotonically increasing sequence of all the elements in {0, 1, tn+1} ∪ {ti}1≤i≤n 2.
For i = 1, · · · , n, let Bi be the Brownian bridge over [xi, xi+1] where Bi(xi) = f(xi) and
Bi(xi+1) = f(xi+1). Let Bi = maxx∈[xi,xi+1] Bi(x) be their respective maxima. At the two
extremities, let B0(x) = W (x1 − x) + f(x1) and Bn+1(x) = W (x − xn+1) + f(xn+1). Their
maxima are respectively B0 = W (x1) + f(x1) and Bn+1 = W (1 − xn+1) + f(xn+1). The
cumulative distribution functions of maxima are given by


















P(Fn+1 ≤ m) =
n+1∏
i=0
P(Bi ≤ m). (3.7)
The above expressions make use of the function value in the next sample f(tn+1), what
we really want is to use only the information from the first n samples to examine whether
2Assuming no repeating elements among them.
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Fn(tn+1) is close to Fn without knowing the value of f(tn+1). To this end, we simply apply
the law of total probability to the Fn+1 and we obtain
P(Fn ≤ Fn(tn+1) + ε) =
∫ ∞
m
P(Fn+1 ≤ m+ ε|f(tn+1) = m)φFn(tn+1)(m)dm. (3.8)
where m = max1≤i≤n f(xi)−ε and φFn(tn+1) is the Gaussian probability distribution function
of Fn(tn+1). We observe that when m  f(xi) and m  f(xi+1), we have P(Bi ≤ m) ≈ 1
and φFn(tn+1) ≈ 0 for tn+1 ∈ [ti, ti+1]. This reflects the intuition that the function maximum is
most likely to be reached in the intervals whose endpoints are close to the sample maximum.
If we use this approximation very generously in calculating (3.7), then P(Fn+1 ≤ m) = 1
if m > m and P(Fn+1 ≤ m) = 0 if m < m. Instead of points close to the maximum, we
simply look for points greater than the sample maximum. This is the traditional acquisition
function used in Bayesian optimization [4, §2.3].




























Each integral takes the form∫ ∞
m̄











exp(−(s21 + s22 + s23))ds1ds2ds3
where S = {(s1, s2, s3) ∈ Rm | 0 ≤ s1 ≤ a′1s3− b′1, 0 ≤ s2 ≤ a′2s3− b′2, s3 ≥ m′}. This integral
can be numerically evaluated with Monte Carlo integration or other approximation methods
[7, 18].
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3.2 Multi-Variable Bayesian Optimization
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is defined through the concept of best responses.
Each player does not have the intent to optimize their payoff function over the entire space
of strategy profiles, but instead, they optimize their payoff function along their own action
space while assuming other players’ actions are kept fixed. In this section, we still assume
the action space of each player is one-dimensional, but we extend the Bayesian optimization
approach to include all the players of a game.
3.2.1 A Generalization of the Wiener process
Unknown values of a function with several real variables can be modeled with random
fields, which generalize stochastic processes. Traditionally, the generalization is carried out
isotropically with respect to the variables, because most applications of Bayesian optimiza-
tion seek global optima of a function. However, as we are interested in equilibria of games,
we only need optimality along one variable with all the other variables kept fixed, so we can
generalize the Wiener process in an anisotropic fashion by requiring the generalized Wiener
process to be a Wiener process in each of its variables.
Definition 4 (Generalized Wiener Process on Rm+ ). A function ψ : Rm+ → L0(Ω,R) is
a generalized Wiener process if, for any y ∈ Rm+ and any k ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, the function
(ψy,k −ψy,k(0))/σ is a standard Wiener process for some σ > 0, where ψy,k : R+ → L0(Ω,R)
is the function given by ψy,k(x) = ψ(y1, · · · , yk−1, x, yk+1, · · · , ym).
The simplest generalization of the Wiener process can be given as the follows.






Then ψ is a generalized Wiener process.
Proof. By definition, ψy,k is also a zero-mean Gaussian process and E[ψy,k(x)ψy,k(x′)] =
‖y‖1 − yk + min{x, x′}. Hence E[(ψy,k(x)− ψy,k(0))(ψy,k(x′)− ψy,k(0))] = min{x, x′}.
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The process defined above can be written as a sum of m independent Wiener processes
along each coordinate of its variables ψ(y) =
∑m
j=1Wj(yj). However, this process has a
fundamental flaw, that is the values of ψ at certain locations are perfectly correlated.
Proposition 7. The two-dimensional generalized Wiener process ψ defined in Proposition 6
satisfies ψ(1, 1) = ψ(1, 0) + ψ(0, 1).
Proof. By 3.10, we have E[ψ(1, 1)ψ(1, 1)] = E[(ψ(1, 0) + ψ(0, 1))(ψ(1, 0) + ψ(0, 1))] =
E[ψ(1, 1)(ψ(1, 0) + ψ(0, 1))] = 2. Therefore ψ(1, 1) = ψ(1, 0) + ψ(0, 1).
A quadratic term can be added to (3.10) to fix this problem.
Proposition 8. Let λ > 0. Let ψ : Rm+ → L0(Ω,R) be a zero-mean Gaussian process given









min{yj, y′j}min{yl, y′l}. (3.11)
Then ψ is a generalized Wiener process without linear correlation.
Proof. By definition, ψy,k is also a zero-mean Gaussian process and E[ψy,k(x)ψy,k(x′)] =
(1−λyk)(‖y‖1−yk)+(λ/2)(‖yyT‖1,1−yTy)+(1+λ‖y‖1−λyk) min{x, x′}. Hence E[(ψy,k(x)−
ψy,k(0))(ψy,k(x
′)− ψy,k(0))] = (1 + λ‖y‖1 − λyk) min{x, x′}.
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality states E[ψ(y)(aψ(y′) + bψ(y′′))]2 ≤ E[ψ(y)2]E[(aψ(y′) +
bψ(y′′))2]. Without loss of generality, assume a > 0 and b > 0. Expand all the terms in
the inequality and write them in terms of uj = min{yj, y′j}, vj = min{yj, y′′j }, and wj =
min{y′j, y′′j }. We obtain that the equality holds if and only if u = y = y′ and v = y = y′′.
Another direction of generalization is to extend the domain of the process from the
positive quadrant to the entire Euclidean space.
Definition 5 (Generalized Wiener Process on Rm). A function ψ : Rm → L0(Ω,R) is
a generalized Wiener process if, for any binary vector s ∈ {−1,+1}m, the function y 7→
ψ(s1y1, · · · , smym) restricted on Rm+ is a generalized Wiener process.
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A straightforward generalization is given as follows.
Proposition 9. For any pair of points y ∈ Rm and y′ ∈ Rm, if yiy′i ≥ 0 then let zi = |yi|
and z′i = |y′i|, if yiy′i ≤ 0 then let zi = z′i = 0. Let ψ be a generalized Wiener process
on Rm+ . Then the zero-mean Gaussian process ψ′ on Rm given by the covariance matrix
E[ψ′(y)ψ′(y′)] = E[ψ(z)ψ(z′)] is a generalized Wiener process. In addition, for any y ∈ Rm
and any k ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, the functions defined on R+ by x 7→ (ψ′y,k(x)−ψ′y,k(0))/σ and x 7→
(ψ′y,k(−x)−ψ′y,k(0))/σ are two independent standard Wiener processes for some σ > 0, where
ψ′y,k : R→ L0(Ω,R) is the function given by ψ′y,k(x) = ψ′(y1, · · · , yk−1, x, yk+1, · · · , ym).
Proof. Let s ∈ {−1,+1}m, y ∈ Rm+ , and y′ ∈ Rm+ , then E[ψ′(sy)ψ′(sy′)] = E[ψ(y)ψ(y′)], so
ψ′ is a generalized Wiener process on Rm.
If x ≥ 0 and x′ ≥ 0, then E[ψ′y,k(x)ψ′y,k(x′)] is an affine function in min{x, x′}. If x ≥ 0
and x′ ≥ 0, then E[ψ′y,k(x)ψ′y,k(x′)] is an affine function in min{−x,−x′}. This provides two
Wiener processes as constructed in the proposition. If xx′ ≤ 0, then E[ψ′y,k(x)ψ′y,k(x′)] =
E[ψ′y,k(0)ψ′y,k(0)]. Therefore, these two Wiener processes are independent.
3.2.2 Bayesian Inference
The Bayesian inference for Gaussian processes follows a simple procedure. Let (fi)i be
a sequence of known function values at the respective points yi and (f
′
j)j a sequence of
unknown function values at the respective points y′j. By definition, (f, f
′) is a multivariate




















be the precision matrix. Bayes’s theorem states that the conditional distribution φ(f ′|f) ∝
φ(f, f ′) is again a multivariate Gaussian and lnφ(f ′|f) = −1
2
(f ′)TQf ′+ (f ′)T(Qm′−M(f −
22
m)) +A for some constant A. Hence, the mean vector of φ(f ′|f) is given by m′−Q−1M(f −
m) = m′+UR−1(f−m) and the covariance matrix of φ(f ′|f) is given by Q−1 = W−UR−1UT.
To establish the prior using a generalized Wiener process, we need to define an origin.
It has to be a point where the function has a known deterministic value or at least a known
probability distribution. Given a sequence of known function values (fi)i at the respective
points yi, we can pick an arbitrary i and let yi be the origin. However, it is important to
make sure that the inference result does not depend on the index i we choose.
Proposition 10. Let ψ be the generalized Wiener process constructed in Proposition 9 from
Proposition 6. Bayesian inference performed based on this prior does not depend on the
choosing of the origin.
Proof. Let y1 be the origin, f = (f2), and f




Σ(y2 − y1, y′1 − y1)
Σ(y2 − y1, y2 − y1)
(f2 − f1).
Let y2 be the origin, f = (f1), and f
′ = (f ′1), then the inferred mean of f
′ is given by
f2 +
Σ(y1 − y2, y′1 − y2)
Σ(y1 − y2, y1 − y2)
(f1 − f2).
The inferred means are identical if and only if
Σ(y2 − y1, y′1 − y1)
Σ(y2 − y1, y2 − y1)
+
Σ(y1 − y2, y′1 − y2)
Σ(y1 − y2, y1 − y2)
= 1.
Processes constructed in Proposition 9 satisfy Σ(−x,−x′) = Σ(x, x′). So the inferred
means are identical if and only if
Σ(y1 − y2, y1 − y′1) + Σ(y1 − y2, y′1 − y2) = Σ(y1 − y2, y1 − y2). (3.12)
Consider the jth component Σ(y1j−y2j, y1j−y′1j)+Σ(y1j−y2j, y′1j−y2j)−Σ(y1j−y2j, y1j−y2j).
Without loss of generality, assume y2j ≥ y1j.
• Suppose y2j ≥ y1j ≥ y′1j, then Σ(y1j − y2j, y1j − y′1j) + Σ(y1j − y2j, y′1j − y2j) − Σ(y1j −
y2j, y1j − y2j) = 0 + (y2j − y1j)− (y2j − y1j) = 0.
• Suppose y2j ≥ y′1j ≥ y1j, then Σ(y1j − y2j, y1j − y′1j) + Σ(y1j − y2j, y′1j − y2j) − Σ(y1j −
y2j, y1j − y2j) = (y′1j − y1j) + (y2j − y′1j)− (y2j − y1j) = 0.
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• Suppose y′1j ≥ y2j ≥ y1j, then Σ(y1j − y2j, y1j − y′1j) + Σ(y1j − y2j, y′1j − y2j) − Σ(y1j −
y2j, y1j − y2j) = (y2j − y1j) + 0− (y2j − y1j) = 0.
Therefore, (3.12) holds. As a result of (3.12), the inferred variances of f ′ are also identical
regardless of which origin is chosen.
The quadratic terms in (3.11) fail (3.12). To restore the symmetry among yi, we add the











min{zj − yij, z′j − yij}min{zl − yij, z′l − yij}.
Unlike traditional Bayesian inference, each observation of the function values adds uncer-
tainty onto the prior.
3.2.3 Bayesian Optimization
The generalizations proposed in §3.2.1 allow us to make use of the properties of the stan-
dard Wiener process and Brownian bridge by restricting the multivariate process along any
of its variables. More specifically, the mean of ψz,k(x) is piecewise affine in x and the variance
of ψz,k(x) is piecewise quadratic in x. These pieces are connected at the kth coordinates of
the points where the function values are known. Let rz,k(x) = (z1, · · · , zk−1, x, zk+1, zm).
Suppose we want to calculate the probability that a point C = rz,k(xC) reaches the path
maximum within a tolerance ε along the affine line {y ∈ Rm | ∀i 6= k : yi = zi}. Then we
only need to perform Bayesian inference at point C, the connecting points rz,k(yik), and the
boundary points rz,k(0) and rz,k(1). Let (x0, · · · , xn+1) be the strictly increasing sequence
of the elements of {0, 1, yik | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Let µf and Σf be the mean vector and the
covariance matrix of the function values f := (f0, f1, · · · , fn, fn+1, fC) corresponding to the
points (x0, · · · , xn+1, xC). Then the probability P(F (C) ≥ Fz − ε) is given by the law of
total probability
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P(F (C) ≥ Fz − ε) =
∫














where S := {f ∈ Rn+3 | ∀i = 0, · · · , n+1 : fC ≥ fi−ε}. This integral can again be expressed
as a sum of Gaussian integrals over polytopes.
Figure 3: Example problem. Given the function values f(A), f(B), and f(D), we want to
calculate the probability that F (C) reaches the path maximum max{F (C) | uC fixed}. The
connecting points where the Bayesian inference is performed is K,G, J , and C.
Example 2. Consider the problem illustrated in Fig 3. We want to find out the probability
that the action vC of player a2 is a best response to the action uC of player a1 within a
tolerance level ε after knowing the a2’s payoff function values at three strategy profiles A,B,
and D. The conditional distribution of F (C) is given by the Gaussian
φ(fC |fA, fB, fD) ∝ φ(fB, fD, fC |fA).
The mean and the variance of this Gaussian are piecewisely affine or quadratic, as plotted
in Fig 4. On each segment, we recognise either expression from (3.1) - (3.3).
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Figure 4: Numerical results of Fig 3 as function of the coordinate along the search dimension.
(a) The first plot shows the function values at the sample points. The numbers printed next
to the points represents the position of the respective sample points relative to the search
dimension. (b, c) The mean and the variance of the probabilistic belief of the function values
along the search dimension. (d) The probability that the path maximum is attained within
a small threshold along the search dimension.
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3.3 Bayesian Optimization for Parametrized Games
Figure 5: A strategy profile C of a two-player game within the action spaces.
The point C in Fig 5 is a Nash equilibrium of the two-player game as if Fa2(DE) ≤ Fa2(C)
and Fa1(DE) ≤ Fa1(C). The probability that C reaches a Nash equilibrium within a small
threshold is
P(Fa2(DE) ≤ Fa2(C) + ε and Fa1(JK) ≤ Fa1(C) + ε) (3.15)
As increments along ya1 and ya2 are mutually independent given F (C), the above probability
(3.15) can be written as∫
P(Fa2(DE) ≤ m2 + ε)P(Fa1(JK) ≤ m1 + ε)φF (C)(m1,m2)dm.

















where S = ∏a∈A Sa = {f ∈ R(n+3)|A| | fa,C ≥ fa,i − ε}.






is a two-player zero-sum game, the probability of a point (x, y) reaching minimax is given
by ∫
P(ϕ(x) ≥ m− ε)P(ϕ(y) ≤ m+ ε)φϕ(x,y)(m)dm (3.16)
where ϕ(y) = maxx∈X ϕ(x, y) and ϕ(x) = miny∈Y ϕ(x, y). The minimization over y is a high





















So it is necessary to compare the values reached at the probable local minima. To do so, we
can perform Bayesian inference for all the probable local minima.
Given the equilibrium constraint y ∈ Φ(x), we first question whether (x, y) is feasible,
if so, then it has a chance greater than (3.16) of being a solution, because some of its
competitors may be eliminated for being unfeasible. Suppose the increment ϕ(x′, y)−ϕ(x, y)










Take into consideration of the equilibrium constraint y ∈ Φ(x), and let q be the probability
of (x′, y) being a game equilibrium. The point (x′, y) eliminates (x, y) as a minimax solution
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if the increment ϕ(x′, y)− ϕ(x, y) is positive and (x′, y) is a game equilibrium. Suppose the











We want to transform this multiplicative effect on the probability into an additive effect
on the Gaussian. Define the effective mean of the Gaussian increment ϕ(x′, y) − ϕ(x, y) as




















The values of δ and µ′ as a function of q and µ are shown in Fig 6.
Figure 6: δ and µ′ as a function of q and µ. Both functions have a vertical asymptote at
q = 0.
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There are two adverse consequences of this method. First, the modified process reaches
−∞ at some points. These are the sampled points strictly dominated by other sampled
points. From a probabilistic point of view, we are not interested in these isolated points,
but their neighboring points may have mean of very large magnitude and cause numerical
instability. To avoid this, we can let the effective mean be max{µ′, θ} instead for some
threshold θ < 0. We can see from Fig 6 that we do not need to set θ very small to avoid a
noticeable false increase in q. Second, the effective mean µ′ may not be piecewise linear in
x′ although the original mean µ is. To circumvent this problem, we can make use of linear
interpolation to divide the whole segment into smaller pieces, then the formulae (3.4) - (3.6)
are again applicable on each segment.







P(ϕ(y) ≥ m0 − ε)
(∏
a∈A




where m := (m0,ma)a∈A and φx,y(m) is the joint distribution of ϕ(x, y) = m0 and Fa(x, y) =
ma. We assume x and ya are all one-dimensional, but this can be generalized into high
dimensional variables by optimizing over each of their coordinates and compare the function
values of their local optima. Each probability factor is calculated with (3.7) using (3.4)
- (3.6) on separate segments. These functions are obtained by solving Gaussian inference
problems. These functions for ϕ are adjusted and linearly interpolated by δ according to Fig
6, where q is calculated as∫ ∏
a∈A
P(Fa(x, y−a) ≥ ma − ε)φx,y(m)dm. (3.19)
To conclude, the remarkable feature of the Bayesian optimization is its flexibility in
dealing with complex structures such as multilevel optimization and equilibrium constraints,
because it can use simple rules of probabilities to translate the logical problem behind the
complex formulation.
30
4.0 Applications and Related Problems






admits many specific applications, which will be discussed in this chapter.
4.1 Centralization and Decentralization
Real world applications often face different levels of centralization in a system. This can
be a design problem in the organization of governments, in the control of currencies and
transactions, or in smart grid or IoT (Internet of things) protocols. Centralized systems are
often characterized as efficient yet prone to risk and error, and decentralized systems the
opposite.
The game Fa(x, y) describes the behavior of a decentralized system. The objective func-
tion ϕ(x, y) in (4.1) describes the behavior of a centralized system. By establishing the
equilibrium as the constraint in (4.1), we make sure that both systems achieve the same out-
come y when they reach optimality and equilibrium respectively. Suppose ϕ is independent
of x, then (4.1) describes the following problem: given a centralized system that optimizes
ϕ, we want to design a decentralized system (by choosing a value of x), so that its worst-
case outcome has the same characteristics as the centralized system: optimizing ϕ as much
as possible. On the other hand, suppose Fa is independent of x, then (4.1) describes the
following problem: given a decentralized system Fa, we want to design a centralized system
(by choosing a value of x) that is optimal when it operates under the worst-case outcome of
the decentralized system.
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More generally, we can put two games of different levels of decentralization as the con-







s.t. y1 ∈ Φ1(x)
y2 ∈ Φ2(x)
One game may have M players while the other may have M ′ players. Having two games
in the constraints does not change the nature of the problem, because we can consider two
games as a single game of two groups of players where each group of player have no impact
on the payoff of the players in the other group.
4.2 Linear-Quadratic Games
Linear-quadratic games are the most basic type of dynamical games with nice properties
and well studied solutions. When there is only one agent, the game is simply a control




(xTQx+ uT1R1u1 + u
T
2R2u2)dt
s.t. ẋ = Ax+B1u1 +B2u2


















s.t. ẋ = Ax+B1u1 +B2u2.
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Suppose these two problems admit the same linear feedback ui = Kix as solution, then
they are related by the following system of equations
Ac =A−B1K1 −B2K2 (4.2)
0 =BTi P −RiKi (4.3)
0 =BTi P −RiiKi (4.4)





















Here, Eqs (4.2), (4.3), and (4.5) solve the centralized control, while Eqs (4.2), (4.4), (4.6),
and (4.7) solve the decentralized game.
Assume the system dynamics (A,B1, B2) are known, the conversion from control to game
is to solve for (Qi, Rij) given (P,Q,Ri), and vice versa for conversion from game to control.
For either direction of the conversion we perform, Ki and Ac can always be expressed by
known quantities by solving the original problem, then the decision variables are reduced to
(P,Q,Ri) or (Pi, Qi, Rij), in which the remaining constraints (4.3), (4.5) or (4.4), (4.6), (4.7)
are a linear system.
Assume that both players have the same control space. Denote the dimension of the
state space by nx and the dimension of the control space by nu. When the centralized
control is converted to the decentralized control, there are 2nx(nx + 1) + 2nu(nu + 1) scalar
unknowns and 2nxnu + nx(nx + 1) scalar equations. As expected, this system is always
under-determined. When the decentralized control is converted to the centralized control,
there are nx(nx+1)+nu(nu+1) scalar unknowns and 2nxnu+nx(nx+1)/2 scalar equations.
Note that there is no guarantee whether this system is under-determined or over-determined.
When the system is over-determined, the core of these two players is empty. They cannot
achieve a unifying goal following their own agenda.
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4.3 Inverse Game
The problem of inverse game is closely related to the problem of game design. The
inverse problem of dynamic games is a natural extension of the single-agent IRL (inverse
reinforcement learning) problem. Our focus here is the static games instead.
Let (ŷi)1≤i≤n be n sample points in Y . The inverse game problem looks for a value of
the parameter x ∈ X such that all the sample points are equilibria of the game, i.e.
fa(x, ŷi) ≥ fa(x, ra(ŷi, yai))
for all i ∈ N such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for all a ∈ A, and for all yai ∈ Ya.








(fa(x, ra(ŷi, yai))− fa(x, ŷi)).
A solution to the minimax problem is a solution to the inverse game problem if the minimax
has a value of zero. Otherwise, it suggests all the samples cannot be equilibria of a feasible
game simultaneously.
Suppose Y is compact and fa are twice continuously differentiable, uniformly bounded,
and uniformly equicontinuous in x. The minimax problem can be approximated by the











(fa(x, ra(ŷi, yai))− fa(x, ŷi))
)
dyai.
Instead of matching the payoffs, the inverse game problem can also match the actions




s.t. ∀y′ : fa(x, yai) ≥ fa(x, ra(yi, y′ai))
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or through an equivalent MPEC
min
x,y
‖ŷ − y‖2 (4.8)





In addition, any occurrence of y in the constraints can be replaced by ŷ.
Problem (4.8) is structurally similar to (4.1). They are both bilevel optimizations with
an MPEC as the inner optimization. On the other hand, we can formulate (4.1) using a





λ‖ŷ − y‖2 + ϕ(x, y)





This relaxation transform the equilibrium constraint in (4.1) into optimality constraint by
decoupling the actions and the responses.
4.4 Inverse Bimatrix Game
Bimatrix games are one of the easiest and most researched types of games in modern
game theory. A bimatrix game consists of two players with finite action spaces. To study the
equilibrium of a bimatrix game, we suppose the players have the ability to randomize their
actions over the entire action spaces with any desired probabilities, and their goals are to
maximize their respective expected payoffs. These probability distributions are called mixed
strategies and the Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies with respect to the expected payoffs
are called mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Definition 6. A bimatrix game consists of a pair of matrices (CA, CB) ∈ M(m,n)2. A
pair of discrete probability distributions (pA, pB) ∈ ∆m−1 ×∆n−1 is a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium to the bi-matrix game if
pA ∈ arg max
qA∈∆m−1
qTACApB




Theorem 1 (Nash). Every bimatrix game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
The equilibrium condition can also be written as
eTi CApB ≥ eTj CApB (4.10)
pTACBek ≥ pTACBel (4.11)
for all i ∈ supp pA, k ∈ supp pB, j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, and l ∈ {1, · · · , n}. Inequality (4.10) states
that all the row vectors of CA belong to one of the two half-spaces separated by a hyperplane
orthogonal to pB and the row vectors indexed by supp pA belong to that hyperplane.
To study the payoff matrices, we need to understand how much information they actually
provide.
Definition 7. Two matrices (CA, C
′
A) ∈ M(m,n)2 are equivalent if for any matrix CB ∈
M(m,n) and any pair of distributions (pA, pB) ∈ ∆m−1 ×∆n−1: (pA, pB) is an equilibrium
to (CA, CB) if and only if it is also an equilibrium to (C
′
A, CB).
The equivalence defines the quotient topology. For instance, when m = 2 and n = 1,
the best response is uniquely determined by sign((CA)21− (CA)11). An equivalent condition
of equivalence between CA and C
′
A is that they satisfy (4.10) simultaneously for any pB.
Consider CA as the polytope in Rn with m vertices being the m row vectors of CA, then CA
is uniquely determined upto equivalence by all the facets whose outward-pointing normal
vector is nonnegative. Translations and uniform positive scalings are equivalence. So we can
limit CA in a unit cube.
It is more common that an external agent is able to observe an outcome (i, k) than the
equilibrium (pA, pB), so it is necessary to first estimate the probability distributions from a
few outcomes. However, if a game admits multiple equilibria, then different outcomes may
come from different distributions. If there may or may not be other equilibria other than
(pA, pB), without additional information, it is reasonable to postulate that all the possible
equilibria altogether bring an additional uniform probability to all the outcomes, as if the







)+(1−r)(pA, pB) for some
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r ∈ (0, 1). This provides a method to infer the equilibrium (pA, pB) from an outcome count






(((1− r)pA(i) + r/m)((1− r)pB(k) + r/n))α(i,k)+c(i,k)−1
where α(i, k) > 0 is the concentration parameter of the Dirichlet distribution. It can be used
to reflect preferred outcomes such as focal points [29].























where c′(i, k) = α(i, k) + c(i, k) − 1. The positivity of probabilities requires r to be small.







i pA = 1,
∑
k pB = 1, pA ≥ 0, pB ≥ 0
pTACBek ≥ pTACBel or pTBek = 0.
To more accurately infer the payoff matrix of a player A, they need to play games against
different adversaries B, so that each adversary provides a different constraint.
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4.5 Neural Network Representation
In our model, the payoff functions and the design objectives are parametrized by the
design variable x. The universal approximation theorem suggests that a neural network
can approximate any continuous function on a compact Euclidean set to a given degree
of precision with a finite set of parameters. So even when the underlying functions are
completely left for design, we can using neural networks to represent them.
Represent the payoff functions in the game by a single-layer artificial neural network
using the universal approximation theorem. Let x := (v, w) ∈ RM := RW×K × RW×(1+N)
be the parameters of the artificial neural network f̄ : RM × RN → RK given by f̄k(x, ȳ) =∑W
j=1 vjkσ(
∑N
i=1wjiȳi + wj0) where σ is a smooth discriminatory function [8]. Let rk :
RN × Rnk → RN be the kth substitution function and fk : RN × Rnk → R the kth player’s























Figure 7: Structure of the single-layer artificial neural network representing the payoff func-
tions. The numbers above lines are indices of the corresponding variables.
The downside of representing the objective functions with neural networks is that the
function they represent may be too arbitrary. It is hard to ensure the existence of an equi-
librium because the weights do not provide much information about the function properties.
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One solution is to limit the functions to be designed within the set of convex functions,
which guarantees the existence of a solution under mild conditions. Convexity may also be
a desired property of the function to be designed.
A fully input-convex neural network [3] is a recurrent neural network whose output zk is
a convex function of the input y through k layers of activation
∀i = 0, · · · , k − 1 : zi+1 = σi(Uizi + Viy + bi)
where Ui are matrices of nonnegative components and σi are nondecreasing convex functions.
Because of the recurrent nature of the fully input-convex neural network, the backprop-
agation of gradient can be numerically challenging. The Bayesian approach can have an
advantage in finding the optimal weights in this type of networks.
z0
U0 z1
U1 · · · Ui−1 zi Ui zi+1 Ui+1 · · · Ul−1 zl
y
V0 Vi−1 Vi Vl−1· · · · · ·
Figure 8: Structure of a fully input-convex neural network.
4.6 Partial Information
The design problems we study in this dissertation focus on the explicit parameters in the
payoff functions. There are also many other degrees of freedom in games that control the
players’ behavior. Player’s reaction to uncertainties is one major factor. This is traditionally
captured by the expected utility or other risk measure functionals. In this section, I propose
the multi-objective optimization approach to games with partial information [15]. As a
result, the design parameter may appear not only in the payoff functions, but also in the
game constraints.
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The information structure of a game with partial information is modeled mathematically
by a σ-algebra on the state space for each agent. The simplest σ-algebras are those gener-
ated by finite partitions of the state space, called the information partitions. As a result,
measurable functions have constant value on each element of the partition, so a strategy of
agent a can be characterized by a function ua : Pa → Ua or a vector ua ∈ U |Pa|a where Ua is
their action space and Pa is their information partition.
Instead of the exact value of the state, the players in a game with partial information
only know the sets in their respective information partitions to which the state belongs
x ∈ Ea ∈ Pa. A greedy player would like to find a strategy ua(Ea) optimal in all the possible
states x ∈ Ea. This is however a multi-objective optimization problem. In general, multi-
objective optimization problems have no solution which simultaneously optimizes all the
objectives. Instead, we study all the non-dominated solutions in multi-objective optimization
problems. In games with partial information, we can study all the equilibria constituted of
non-dominated responses. By combining the weighted sum method and the ε-constraint
method in multi-objective optimization, I propose the following definition.
Definition 8. In a two-player normal-form game with partial information, a pure strategy
profile (u∗A, u
∗
B) is an equilibrium of εX-constrained FX-optimal strategies if ∀EA ∈ PA, ∀EB ∈
PB :
u∗A(EA) ∈ arg max
uA∈UA
FA[JA(·, uA, u∗B(·))] (4.12-A)
s.t.JA(·, uA, u∗B(·)) ≥ εA on EA
u∗B(EB) ∈ arg max
uB∈UB
FB[JB(·, u∗A(·), uB)] (4.12-B)
s.t.JB(·, u∗A(·), uB) ≥ εB on EB
where εX is a real function on EX and FX is a non-trivial positive continuous linear functional
of functions on EX .
I proved in [15] the conditions under which these equilibria exist and are equivalent
to non-dominated responses in multi-objective optimization. Bayesian Nash equilibria are
special cases where FX are probability measures and εX are lower bounds. But in general,
Definition 8 also offers solutions that are not attainable as Bayesian Nash equilibria. The
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parameters εX are very critical to the properties of these equilibria. Large values of εX can
make both players’ payoffs meet desired thresholds but may also lead to infeasibility instead.
Posing a minimax problem subject to the equilibrium constraints (4.12) with εX as the upper
level optimization variable allows us to find an equilibrium with the best performance among
all of those constituted of non-dominated responses.
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5.0 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
Minimax problems with equilibrium constraints are a fundamental subject in engineer-
ing design worthy of great attention from both theoretical and numerical research. They
translate the robustness of a design against the uncertainty due to the possible presence
of a multitude of equilibria in a game. A significant contribution of this dissertation is to
shed light on the importance and the complexity of this type of problems. I wish to con-
tinue on this line of work by applying this design principle to real engineering or economic
applications.
The Bayesian approach proposed in this dissertation is a novel strategy to solve MPEC
and multilevel programming. Its ability to solve these problems comes from the simple rules
of probabilities which translate the logical problem behind the complex formulations. It also
provides a global point of view which allows a robust optimal design within the parameter
space. Other numerical programming methods with a global characteristics can also be
considered in the future as a solution methodology to enrich the toolbox for this type of
problems.
Bayesian optimization itself is an area of active research, especially for its applications
in machine learning. This dissertation shows the power of Bayesian optimization in dealing
with minimax problems with equilibrium constraints. With proper examination, the same
methodology can be applied to other game theoretical problems, which I would also like to
investigate in the future. The Bayesian approach proposed in this dissertation also requires
further works to consolidation its theoretical soundness and improve numerical efficacy.
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